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The  non-rivalness  of scientiﬁc  knowledge  has  traditionally  underpinned  its status  as  a  public  good.  In
contrast  we  model  science  as  a contribution  game  in which  spillovers  differentially  beneﬁt  contributors
over  non-contributors.  This  turns  the game  of  science  from  a prisoner’s  dilemma  into  a game  of ‘pure
coordination’,  and from  a  ‘public  good’  into  a ‘contribution  good’.  It redirects  attention  from  the  ‘free
riding’  problem  to the  ‘critical  mass’  problem.  The  ‘contribution  good’  speciﬁcation  suggests  several  areas
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. Introduction
.1. Towards a new economics of science
In their landmark paper Dasgupta and David (1994) described as
he ‘old economics of science’ the work of Nelson (1959) and Arrow
1962) in which the ‘public good’ characteristics of knowledge were
een as leading inevitably to ‘market failure’ and ‘underinvestment’
n science. Their objective was to develop a research agenda for a
new economics of science’ using contemporary advances in the
conomics of information, the theory of principal and agent, con-
ract theory, the theory of property rights and the theory of games.
omer too (1990) has suggested that research does not have purely
ublic good characteristics.
These new tools would help to explain the structure of prevailing
nstitutions and to explore ways in which ‘knowledge differs from
ther durable public goods, such as, for example, laws and constitu-
ions, or lighthouses, for that matter’ (p. 491). In particular Dasgupta
nd David contrast the social organisation of ‘Science’ with that of
Technology’. The ‘republic of science’ with its relatively ‘open’ con-
entions with respect to disclosure and the sharing of new results
s buttressed by incentive mechanisms that reward ‘priority’. The
∗ Corresponding author at: University of Buckingham, Buckingham MK18 1BY,
K.  Tel.: +44 01280 820207; fax: +44 01280 820203.
E-mail address: terence.kealey@buckingham.ac.uk (T. Kealey).
048-7333 © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.01.009
Open access under CC BY-NC-NDworld of technology with its more secretive and restrictive treat-
ment of knowledge is buttressed by property rights (patents) and
incentives derived from the pursuit of rents derived from inno-
vation. Individual scientists in this conception might inhabit both
worlds although the behavioural norms in each are very different.
In a telling sentence Dasgupta and David (p.498) assert that ‘mod-
ern societies need to have both communities ﬁrmly in place and
attend to maintaining a synergistic equilibrium between them’.
1.2. The contribution good
This paper offers a model of science that incorporates both
the worlds of exclusion and openness. It does so in a way  that
casts some new light on how these seemingly contradictory prin-
ciples can co-exist and how institutions have evolved to harness
them to social advantage. At the heart of our model there lies
a simple set of propositions. Scientiﬁc knowledge indeed can be
regarded as a common resource. The knowledge itself is non-rival.
But unlike lighthouses which in the conventional story dispense
their blessings on contributors and non-contributors alike, accu-
mulated scientiﬁc knowledge is not automatically accessible by any
passer-by or person of average curiosity. To understand scientiﬁc
knowledge it is necessary to become a scientist (Rosenberg, 1990).
Further (and more important for our model) even codiﬁed knowl-
edge cannot be properly understood without access to the tacit
knowledge that is a complementary product of scientiﬁc research
Polanyi (1967). Dasgupta and David (pp. 493–495) recognise that
the ‘complementarity between the two  forms of knowledge has
important implications for the way  research ﬁndings can be dis-
seminated’ and we concentrate on one such possible implication.
 license.
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itive advantage, and, in some circumstances, a reason to expect a
socially suboptimal industry size and to recommend a public sub-
sidy.
2 Government purchases clearly affect the conduct of science – most obviously in
the ﬁelds of defence, computer systems or the products of the medical equipment
and  pharmaceuticals industries.
3 The term ‘invisible college’ was ﬁrst used by Price (1963). He  used the termT. Kealey, M. Ricketts / Rese
f the possession of ‘tacit knowledge’ is a necessary condition for
nderstanding a pool of codiﬁed papers and results; and if a nec-
ssary condition for accumulating tacit knowledge is the actual
ndertaking of scientiﬁc work and engaging with others in the
epublic of science; then the only people who are able to bene-
t directly from an accumulating pool of research results will be
hose who have in some degree contributed to it.
This ‘tacit dimension’ to scientiﬁc knowledge suggests two con-
equences. The costs of copying research and of commercialising
t are signiﬁcant, and these costs are higher for ‘outsiders’ than for
insiders’. When Mansﬁeld et al. (1981) examined 48 products that,
uring the 1970s, had been copied by companies in the chemicals,
rugs, electronics and machinery industries of New England, they
ound that the costs of copying were, on average, 65 per cent of the
osts of original invention, consuming on average 70 per cent of
he time of original invention. Those costs and time frames reﬂect
he fact that the copiers had to commit signiﬁcant resources into
re)discovering for themselves the tacit knowledge embedded in
he original discoveries and embedded in their commercialisation
which involves the creation of new production facilities, etc.) thus
howing that the (re)discovery of tacit knowledge incurs very real
osts.
Equally, in his study of spillovers of knowledge of the Trans-
ersely Excited Atmospheric (TEA) Pressure CO2 Laser, Collins
1974, p. 176) suggested that the costs of copying solely from the
iterature could become effectively prohibitive because “To date,
o-one to whom I have spoken has succeeded in building a TEA laser
sing written sources (including blueprints and internal reports)
s the sole source of information”. Personal visits to pre-existing
EA laboratories were an essential part of learning how to build
hem. But signiﬁcant prior research in the ﬁeld was needed before
isiting for two reasons. First, because “it was only previous knowl-
dge” that enabled visitors to beneﬁt from what they had seen
Collins, 1974, p. 177) and second because “nearly every labora-
ory expressed a preference for giving information only to those
ho had something to give in return” (p. 181).
It is this requirement to accumulate tacit knowledge through
 process of mutual engagement that to some extent explains the
bserved willingness of scientists to share knowledge even in the
or proﬁt sector. In a survey of 11 American steel companies, von
ippel (1988) found that 10 of them regularly swapped propri-
tary information with their rivals. In an international survey of 102
rms, Allen et al. (1983, p. 202) found that no fewer than 23 per cent
f their important innovations came from swapping information
ith rivals – “Managers approached apparently competing ﬁrms in
ther countries directly and were provided with surprisingly free
ccess to their technology”. Commercial scientists share knowledge
ith each other because it is judged that isolation from the mutual
earning engendered by the process of sharing will ultimately leave
hem at a disadvantage.
A pure contribution good we therefore deﬁne as a good whose
eneﬁts are non-rival over contributors but that cannot be accessed
y non-contributors. The tacit dimension to scientiﬁc knowledge
eans that it will tend to exhibit these characteristics. Spillovers
ill favour contributors over non-contributors and self-interest
ill therefore produce a degree of ‘openness’. We  do not doubt that
he nature of certain types of academic contract and the evolved
onventions of universities and other research organisations also
uttress ‘openness’.1 Our results, however, will depend not merely
pon this ‘openness’ but on the additional fact that the beneﬁciaries
re, either in the nature of things or as a result of additional sup-
orting institutions, those scientists who have made a contribution.
1 Dasgupta and David (1994, pp. 498–505) discuss the nature of these contracts.
ee also Lazear (1997) and Carmichael (1988).olicy 43 (2014) 1014–1024 1015
Dasgupta and David (p. 502) invoke the theory of repeated games as
one possible approach to the emergence of cooperative behaviour
between groups of scientists even in the context of the ‘prison-
ers’ dilemma’. Our proposed treatment of science as a ‘contribution
good’ leads to a rather different structure of the game and hence
somewhat different incentives. We  show that the archetypal frame-
work for analysing science changes from the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’
to a game of ‘pure coordination’ – with potentially very different
implications for public policy.
Scientists in our model aim to maximise the rent that can be
achieved from exploiting the common resource of science. They can
only do this if they can also access the world of ‘technology’ with
its legal protections to patent holders or other means to ensure
payment from those ultimately beneﬁting from innovations. Thus,
it is the willingness of people to pay for the (rival and excludable)
products of innovation that ultimately drives the system and we
consider a world in which there are means – either deriving from
secrecy and other impediments to information ﬂows or a robust
framework of patent protection – of securing ﬁnancial gain from
innovation. There is no government or other funding speciﬁcally
for ‘pure science’ (which is not to say that government demand for
particular products deriving from the world of technology might
not be important).2
1.3. Contribution goods and club goods
This paper considers a model of science where scientists must
decide whether or not to make a contribution to knowledge that
can be accessed by other contributing scientists. Contributing sci-
entists form an implicit ‘college’ that might initially be formally and
collectively constituted (a ‘visible’ college) but that might also in
suitable conditions develop and grow spontaneously in response to
purely private interests (an ‘invisible’ college).3 A pure contribution
good is non-rival over contributors but is not accessible by non-
contributors. Where this asymmetry in the availability of external
beneﬁts is sustained not by formally designed and imposed orga-
nisational constraints but by the inherently tacit nature of much
scientiﬁc knowledge, the situation in science takes on the same
character as that which prevails in economic sectors characterised
by Marshallian external economies, agglomeration economies and
network externalities. Indeed Callon (1994, p. 411) speciﬁcally sug-
gests that ‘we need to abandon the notion of information and
use that of network in its place’.4 As the stock of scientiﬁc work
increases, it confers beneﬁts on all users and not just on the
marginal contributor, just as a new ﬁrm might lower the costs of
incumbents in an industry or new members of a social website
might make it more useful to existing users. These circumstances
can be interpreted as an impediment to the initial development of
a sector, a powerful source (once established) of dynamic compet-to  describe the secret nature of the nascent Royal Society in the years before the
Restoration as it avoided publicity and hid from a hostile Church. We use the con-
cept ‘invisible college’ in a somewhat different context as a metaphor to reﬂect not
secrecy but the spontaneous growth of cooperation between contributing scientists.
4 Callon emphasises many of the points that we rely upon in formulating the
contribution good model. The fact that new ideas are often quite difﬁcult to get
across to others and that achieving a common understanding is a prerequisite for
further advance are characteristics of science that are consistent with the approach
of  this paper.
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We  use the word ‘college’ as the collective noun for a group of
cientists. This has afﬁnities with the concept of a ‘club’ analysed by
uchanan (1965) – essentially a means of supplying a good that is
on-rival but excludable (with respect to non-contributors) at low
ost. Buchanan (1965, p. 2) argues that his theory applies to situ-
tions ‘where the optimal sharing group is more than one person
r family but smaller than an inﬁnitely large number’. Science we
rgue is akin to a pure ‘social club’ in that the members themselves
upply the ethos that makes the club attractive. Again, however,
he analogy is not perfect because ‘exclusivity’ can be an impor-
ant feature of social clubs and expansion can adversely affect the
xisting membership. In our model of science membership of the
college’ is not restricted and additional members always make a
on-negative contribution to college resources.
In Sections 3–6 we set out a simple model of science as a contri-
ution good. As a preliminary, Section 2 compares the traditional
ublic good problem with the contribution good problem using the
ramework of a two-person contribution game. Science is not a two
erson game but the two person strategic form enables us to make
lear the assumptions with respect to spillovers that we  rely upon
n the rest of the paper. Section 3 develops the contribution good
odel in the simplest setting of a population of scientists of equal
bility while Section 4 investigates the properties of the model
hen scientists are of variable ability and identiﬁes the equilib-
ium size of ‘college’ that will be formed (and the minimum size
hat is self-sustaining). The welfare implications of the model are
rieﬂy outlined in Section 5 and a special case in which scientists’
bilities take on a uniform distribution is presented in Section 6. In
ection 7 we relate the contribution good model of science to the
istorical development of scientiﬁc institutions and suggest some
ossible future lines of research.
. The public good and contribution good models compared
The public good case is illustrated in the form of a collective
ction game represented by the entries in Table 1. There are two
layers. Each has to decide whether to contribute (si = 1) or not to
ontribute (si = 0) to the joint fund of science (S). This fund is the sum
f the contributions of the players S = si (i = 1, 2). To contribute,
ach player incurs a private cost of c > 0. In the table below, when
oth players contribute the fund of science has a private (gross)
alue to each of H(2). If a single player contributes, the gross pri-
ate value of the scientiﬁc pool is H(1) < H(2). Note that if player
 does not contribute (s2 = 0) but player 1 does contribute (s1 = 1)
he former receives a payoff of H(1). It is possible for each player
herefore to ‘free ride’ on the contribution of the other. The pool of
cience is jointly beneﬁcial and it is non-excludable.
In the pure textbook case of a public good the following assump-
ions are usually made:
1) H(1) − c < 0 – the private beneﬁt of a single contribution is less
than its private cost.
2) 2H(2) − 2c > 0 – the joint ‘social’ beneﬁt from two contributions
is greater than its social cost. Given that the individuals are
identical H(2) − c > 0 and the net private payoff is also positive.
3) H(2) − c < H(1) or H(2) − H(1) < c – the private beneﬁt accruing
to a second contribution falls short of its private cost.
able 1
cience as a public good.
s2 = 1 s2 = 0
H(2) − c H(1)
s1 = 1 H(2) − c H(1) − c
H(1) − c 0
s1 = 0 H(1) 0olicy 43 (2014) 1014–1024
This set of assumptions produces the classic ‘free rider’ equilib-
rium. In a single shot game si = 0 is a dominant strategy for both
individuals and no contributions are made.
An alternative model is to assume that
(1)* H(1) − c > 0 – the private beneﬁt of the ﬁrst contribution
exceeds its cost and
(2)* 2H(2) − 2c > 2H(1) − c or H(2) − H(1) > c/2 – there remain joint
gains to the second contribution.
This produces a ‘chicken game’. If player 1 contributes, it is bet-
ter for player 2 to free ride but if player 1 free rides it is better
for player 2 to contribute. There are two  possible Nash equilib-
ria in pure strategies where one player contributes and the other
does not. Although the Nash equilibria in the ‘chicken’ version both
involve some positive level of contribution, the social optimum is
not achieved. The non-contributing player is not induced to add
further to the common pool because his or her private gain is
restricted to H(2) − H(1) − c < 0 and it is not possible to capture a suf-
ﬁcient portion of the full social value of a further contribution. The
rest leaks away to the other party who gains an ‘external’ beneﬁt
H(2) − H(1).
The literature on games suggests many reﬁnements to these
results. Games that are repeated with the same players and where
strategy choices can be adjusted over time can yield different
results. However, there is little doubt that general acceptance of the
proposition that science would be underprovided without govern-
ment subsidy relies on the basic public goods argument sketched
above.
In Table 2 we adjust the contribution game to take account
of the features that cast doubt on the status of science as a pure
public good. The main point at issue is that each player cannot sim-
ply enjoy the beneﬁts of another player’s scientiﬁc effort ‘freely’.
Absence of a contribution greatly reduces the ability of a scien-
tist to use the pool created by others. To reﬂect this idea, Table 2
records the payoff to a non-contributing scientist attempting to
‘free ride’ as H(1) for 0 ≤  ≤ 1 where the parameter  represents
the degree of ‘publicness’ of science. If  = 1 science is a pure pub-
lic good and the non-contributing scientist gains the same beneﬁt
from another’s contribution as the person actually making it and
without incurring any cost. If  = 0 a non-contributing scientist can
gain no beneﬁt from another scientist’s contribution. This is the
case of the pure contribution good. The beneﬁts of the pool of sci-
ence (S) can be jointly accessed – external beneﬁts do occur, but
they are experienced only by contributing scientists.
The re-conceptualisation of the science problem proposed here
clearly changes the nature of the game substantially. There is, how-
ever, still a collective action problem. Consider ﬁrst the case of the
pure contribution good ( = 0). If H(1) − c < 0 and the private ben-
eﬁt of the ﬁrst contribution falls short of its private cost, the best
response to s1 = 0 is s2 = 0 and the best response to s1 = 1 is s2 = 1.
The payoffs no longer represent a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ as in the
public good model of science, but a game of ‘pure coordination’. In
other words each scientist needs reassurance that the other will
contribute–not because there is a free rider problem but a ‘critical
mass’ problem. If the team is not big enough there will be no private
(or social) gains available. A single contribution yields no private
Table 2
Science as a contribution good.
s2 = 1 s2 = 0
H(2) − c H(1)
s1 = 1 H(2) − c H(1) − c
H(1) − c 0
s1 = 0 H(1) 0
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Let all scientists be of equal ability a. The common pool of sci-T. Kealey, M. Ricketts / Rese
ain with H(1) − c < 0 and neither is there a social gain because the
eneﬁt no longer spills over to the non-contributing scientist.
There are two equilibria in pure strategies to this game – one
here both scientists contribute, and one where neither contribute.
t is natural to ask therefore what conditions are likely to favour the
o-operative outcome of mutual contribution. Clearly, a scientist
ho is certain that the other will contribute will also contribute.
ven a reasonable level of conﬁdence might be sufﬁcient to induce
 contribution. Indeed a risk neutral scientist believing that the
ther was as likely to contribute as not contribute would play s = 1
roviding that
1⁄ 2[H(2) − c] + 1⁄ 2[H(1) − c] > 0 or
H(2) > 2c − H(1) (i) or
[H(2) − c] > −[H(1) − c] (ii)
Expression (i) implies that both scientists will contribute pro-
iding that the private payoff to each H(2) exceeds the sum of all
rivate costs (2c) minus the gross private payoff to a single contri-
ution. In the special case of H(1) = 0 this clearly reduces to H(2) > 2c
 a result discussed in Myatt and Wallace (2009, p. 66) in the con-
ext of a game in which output of a public good below a quota is
estroyed in order to encourage private contributions. In this (non-
ublic good) case the beneﬁt from a single contribution does not
pill over to the other party so that a higher value of H(1) makes
he mutual contribution outcome more rather than less likely.
Expression (ii) reﬂects a slightly different perspective. Loosely,
roviding each scientist has ‘more to gain than to lose’ from con-
ributing the contribution, will be made. More speciﬁcally, for any
iven level of private cost c and private beneﬁt from the ﬁrst con-
ribution H(1), the scientist is more likely to adopt a strategy s = 1
he larger is H(2) and hence the larger is the external beneﬁt con-
erred on the other contributor H(2) − H(1). The reason is simply
hat the external beneﬁt is entirely reciprocal, and a high level of
xternal beneﬁt conferred on the other scientist is matched by an
qually high level of beneﬁt received ‘in exchange’. Although these
xternalities existed in the ‘public good’ model they were not recip-
ocal in quite the same sense. Here, each scientist enters an implicit
xchange agreement. The ‘price’ of using and beneﬁting privately
rom the science of others is to make a contribution to the pool from
hich others can beneﬁt. An environment rich in spillovers is very
ttractive to scientists who can take advantage of them, and offering
heir own work to the pool in exchange for these spillover bene-
ts is the implicit deal that leads to the formation of the invisible
ollege.
Consider now a case where  > 0. From Table 2 it can be seen
hat the ‘free rider’ equilibrium will exist if H(2) − c < H(1). In other
ords the ‘science as a public good’ model re-asserts itself if
H(2) − c
H(1)
< .
For sufﬁciently small values of  however, the contribution game
an be analysed as above. On the continued assumption that each
cientist conjectures that the other is as likely to contribute as not
o contribute, the co-operative outcome will require
H(2) − c] − H(1) > −[H(1) − c]. (ii′)
The invisible college forms if
(2) > 2c − H(1)[1 − ] for 0 <  < [H(2) − c]/H(1). (i′)Instead of assuming a contribution probability of 0.5 and con-
entrating on critical values of the parameter  an alternative
pproach is to calculate the probability (p) above which ‘contri-
ution’ becomes the preferred strategy.olicy 43 (2014) 1014–1024 1017
For risk neutral scientists, ‘contribution’ is the best strategy if the
expected return exceeds the expected return to ‘no contribution’.
Thus
E(s = 1) = p[H(2) − c] + (1 − p)[H(1) − c] and
E(s = 0) = pH(1)
Thus contribution is the best strategy if E(s = 1) > E(s = 0) or if
p >
[c − H(1)]
{H(2) − H(1)[1 + ]}
If  = 0 and there are no spillovers to non-contributors this
reduces to
p >
[c − H(1)]
H(2) − H(1)
Clearly the critical value of p depends upon the size of the loss
on a single unmatched contribution c − H(1) relative to the size of
the spillover from the second contribution H(2) − H(1). The greater
the external beneﬁt, the lower is the critical probability p that will
induce scientists to contribute. Where  is small, spillovers between
contributors encourage contributions. Conversely, for a given level
of spillovers, contribution is more likely (the critical value of p is
lower) the more nearly a single contribution approaches proﬁtabil-
ity.
Although in the case of two scientists this argument seems com-
pelling and the cooperative solution therefore justiﬁed, it is clearly
less persuasive if the coordination of a large number of scientists
is required before mutual proﬁtability is established. Where sci-
entists do not contribute to the common pool it will be difﬁcult
to get them started whereas once the habit has been established
it will become self-enforcing. Some ‘visible college’ is required to
establish a minimum critical level of contribution.
Where H(1) − c > 0 and a single contribution is privately proﬁt-
able, the situation is obviously much more favourable to invisible
college formation. Continuing to assume that H(2) − c > H(1), so
that spillovers to non-contributors are sufﬁciently small, strategy
s = 1 is in this situation a dominant strategy. The limited extent of
spillovers to non-contributors turns a game of chicken into one in
which a collective action problem no longer exists.
Within-college externalities exist in this formulation but the
absence of a contribution margin – the inability of a scientist to vary
at some marginal cost the amount contributed – dissolves the col-
lective action problem once the private proﬁtability of the discrete
contribution is established. In the sections that follow we  continue
investigating the case of discrete contributions. However, in Section
4 scientists are assumed to vary in ability with high ability scientists
contributing more to the pool (and able to beneﬁt more from the
pool) than low ability scientists. Before moving to this elaboration,
Section 3 presents further analysis of the equal ability case.
3. The contribution good with scientists of equal ability
The main determining characteristic of a contribution good is
that, although accessible in common (at some private cost) it can
only be used by a person who has contributed in kind to its provi-
sion. This is capable of generating results quite different from those
associated with a classic ‘public good’ framework.entiﬁc knowledge is assumed to derive from the human capital of
the scientists and can be written
S = na
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here n is the number of scientists in the invisible college.5 This
ool of knowledge is available to all college members. Let each sci-
ntist use the pool as an input into economic activities that yield a
ent () of
 = aH(S) − c
ith H′(S) > 0 and H′′(S) < 0 and where c represents an overhead cost
f scientiﬁc activity for each scientist.
This rent () is assumed to represent the social surplus as well
s the private return to the scientist. It is of course unlikely that
ny scientist would manage to appropriate the full social surplus
erived from his or her use of the common pool. Much would be
xpected to leak away to others during the process of negotiation
ith the owners of cooperating inputs. Some might be lost as a
esult of ‘rent seeking’. In this paper, however, we do not consider
ent seeking losses and our theoretical results do not hinge on the
recise proportion of the rent accruing to the scientist. Losses that
erive from opportunistic behaviour or from lack of legal protection
ight severely restrict scientiﬁc activity. The existence of institu-
ional structures that place limits on opportunistic behaviour and
ermit scientists to contract with ﬁnanciers and others are neces-
ary to the operation of this model. Simple failure to appropriate
he entire available social surplus, however, would not have such
 negative effect. Just as a tax on rent is theoretically neutral, the
haring of rents with other parties will give rise to income effects
ut not substitution effects.
Clearly if aH(S) < c no rents can be achieved by individual sci-
ntists. As n increases however a point may  be reached at which S
asses the critical value at which  = 0 and all scientists can make
ositive economic rents from their use of the pool of knowledge.
et this value of n is given by n*.
For values of n greater than n*, rents are positive for all members
f the invisible college and all members beneﬁt from further entry.
hus, aggregate rents (W) increase without limit as the invisible
ollege ‘explodes’.
Consider for example, the case of H(S) =
√
S.
 = a
√
S − c
The critical value of n* will be determined by a
√
S = c. Thus
c2
a3
= n∗
The case is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Aggregate rents W are given by
 = n(n) = na
√
S − nc = a1.5n1.5 − nc
Thus
dW = (n) + n′(n) = 1.5a1.5n0.5 − c = (a1.5n0.5 − c)
dn
+ 0.5a1.5n0.5 > 0
5 If the common ability level of scientists is set equal to unity, this formulation
tarkly reveals that the size of the common pool of knowledge is simply given by
he  number of contributing scientists, or (when ability is allowed to vary) by some
eighted sum of the contributing scientists. It can be objected that measuring the
ool of science in this way  suppresses any reference to the enormous variety of
ontributions. An analogy would be measuring the resources of a museum or art
allery by the number of its exhibits without reference to the historical periods
epresented or the physical nature of the items. For the purposes of gaining an
nitial insight into the contribution good framework, however, the use of this very
imple measure of the common pool is convenient. Further work using more reﬁned
nd  multi-faceted measures of the pool of scientiﬁc contributions, with degrees of
pillover varying within and across disciplines, might cast much further light on the
odel as well as on its possible implications for science policy.olicy 43 (2014) 1014–1024
and
d2W
dn2
= 0.75a1.5n−0.5 > 0.
In other words new entry to the college produces rents for the
marginal entrant of (a1.5n0.5 − c) and confers positive (and increas-
ing) aggregate external beneﬁts on the other college members of
(0.5a1.5n0.5). The marginal external beneﬁt received by each exist-
ing college member declines as the college grows (′′(n) < 0).
This model clearly yields results that are extreme, but it serves
to illustrate the potential power of a system which (in spite of
extreme jointness in the availability of knowledge) requires the
users of knowledge to add to the pool before useful access can be
achieved. It also suggests a number of factors that will be important
in determining the point of scientiﬁc ‘take-off’ into self-sustained
accumulation to adapt Rostow’s (1990) terminology. The invisible
college requires a minimum membership to be sustainable. This
number will be lower the greater is the ability level of the scien-
tists (a) and the lower is the overhead cost of undertaking scientiﬁc
work (c). For any given values of these parameters college forma-
tion will depend upon the transactions costs of forming a ‘visible’
college. Thus with no change in ability or in the cost of science, a
fall in transactions costs might permit the formation of a college
that would then have self-sustaining characteristics.
4. A model of the invisible college with variable ability
The basic model sketched in Section 3 assumes that additional
scientiﬁc ‘ability’ does not decline but remains at a constant level.
In Section 4 we  make some adjustments to take into account both
variable ability of scientists and bounds on the capacity of scien-
tists of any particular ability to make use of an expanding pool of
knowledge.
Let scientists vary in ability (a).
The frequency of ability a is given by
f (a) for 0 < a < aˆ
Let ä be the ability of the least able scientists in the college. The
frequency of scientists of ability ä or above is therefore:
F(aˆ) − F(a¨) =
a¨
∫ aˆ
f (a)da
Total ‘stock’ of ability equal to or greater than ä is given by
S =
a¨
∫ aˆ
af (a)da = ϕ(a¨)
where ϕ′(a¨) = −a¨f (a¨) < 0 (1)
We continue to suppose that the scientiﬁc knowledge available
for exploitation can be measured by the ‘ability’ of the contributing
scientists and that ϕ(ä) can be interpreted as a common ‘pool’ of
knowledge. Each scientist must invest c in order to gain access to
this pool of scientiﬁc knowledge (a pool that will contain his or her
own  contribution). The ‘rent’ of each scientist from the exploitation
of the common pool is assumed to depend directly on ability. Thus
(a, a¨) = aH[ϕ(a¨)] − c (2)
where H is a function describing the terms on which the pool of
scientiﬁc knowledge deriving from the aggregate human capital
embodied in the contributing scientists can be transformed into
revenue yielding economic output.
We assume H′ ≥ 0; H′′ ≤ 0.
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It follows that privately appropriated rent rises with ability
ecause more able scientists make more productive use of the com-
on  pool:
∂(a, a¨)
∂a
= H[ϕ(a¨)] > 0. (3)
The rent of a person of any given ability declines as the ability
evel of the least able member of the invisible college rises (because
 higher level of ä implies a smaller size of college and a smaller pool
f common resources available to be exploited).
∂(a, a¨)
∂a¨
= aH′[ϕ′(a¨)] ≤ 0 (4)
The rent of the least able members of the college will be
a¨(a¨) = a¨H[ϕ′(a¨)] − c (5)
Thus
∂a¨
∂a¨
= a¨H′[ϕ′(a¨)] + H[ϕ(a¨)]
Or:
∂a¨/∂a¨ = ∂(a, a¨)/∂a¨  + ∂(a, a¨)/∂a
(a = a¨)
The change in the rent of the least able college member as
arginal ability rises is made up of two components. Rent achieved
y the least able (along with all other scientists) is reduced because
he common stock of scientiﬁc knowledge available ϕ(ä) declines
hen scientists of lesser ability are no longer contributing. This is
ffset by the fact that the least able scientist now has higher ability
nd therefore obtains a greater gain from any given stock.
For ä = äH[ϕ(ä)] − c > 0 scientists of lesser ability will continue
o enter until rents are zero at the margin.
Thus:
å = å H[ϕ(å )] − c = 0 (6)
s an equilibrium condition for the size of the invisible college where
 is the ability level of the scientists capable of just making zero rent
the marginal scientists).
Re-arranging (6)(ϕ(å )) = c
å
This equation could be satisﬁed at several values of å – high
arginal ability and a small pool of scientiﬁc knowledge (åH) andibutors have ability ‘a’.
low marginal ability with a relatively high pool of scientiﬁc knowl-
edge (åL). Where the rent of the marginal scientist is growing with
further entry (∂ä/∂ä < 0), the zero proﬁt condition will not be a
stable equilibrium. It will, however, represent the minimum self-
sustaining size for the ‘invisible college’ (åH). Where proﬁts of the
marginal scientist are declining with further entry (∂ä/∂ä > 0) the
zero proﬁt condition will represent a stable equilibrium and the
marginal ability will be lower (åL).
Thus where ä = åH
∂a¨
∂a¨
= åHH′[ϕ′(åH)] + H[ϕ(åH)] < 0
and a larger college will result in higher proﬁts to the marginal
scientist.
This implies
(åH)H′[ϕ′(åH)] +
c
åH
< 0 (from 6)
or
c < (åH)
3f (åH)H′ (using 1)
For a stable equilibrium where ä = åL
∂a¨/∂a¨ > 0 and
c > (åL)
3f (åL)H′.
For åL < ä < åH all contributions are privately proﬁtable and the
invisible college will grow. Before achieving the critical mass
implied by ä = åH (i.e. where ä > åH) however, scientists face the
collective action problem discussed in Section 2 of ensuring that
enough high ability contributors take part in order for the private
payoff to be positive. If there is complete conﬁdence that the thresh-
old åH will be achieved, further growth will be self-sustaining until
marginal ability has declined to åL. Unlike the model presented in
Section 3 there is a limit to the growth of the invisible college as
lower ability levels eventually cause the cost c to exceed the pri-
vate beneﬁts achievable from college ‘membership’ by the marginal
scientists.
5. Aggregate college rents
Social rents generated are the sum total of all private rents.a¨
∫ aˆ
af (a)da = W(a¨)
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Thus
(a¨) =
a¨
∫ aˆ
af (a)H[ϕ(a¨)]da − c
a¨
∫ aˆ
f (a)da
r
W(a¨) = H[ϕ(a¨)]
a¨
∫ aˆ
af (a)da − c
a¨
∫ aˆ
f (a)da
W(a¨) = H[ϕ(a¨)]ϕ(a¨) − c[F(aˆ) − F(a¨)]
(7)
∂W(a¨)/∂a¨ = H[ϕ(a¨)]ϕ′(a¨) + ϕ(a¨)H′[ϕ′(a¨)] + cf (a¨)
∂W(a¨)/∂a¨ = −a¨f (a¨)H[ϕ(a¨)] − a¨f (a¨)ϕ(a¨)H′ + cf (a¨)
(8)
Increasing the lowest ability level of scientists in the college
oses the rents accruing to that group:
a¨f (a¨) = −{a¨f  (a¨)H[ϕ(a¨)] − cf (a¨)}. (9)
It also reduces the proﬁts of scientists in the higher ability
anges:
¨
∫ aˆ(
∂
∂a¨
)
f (a)da = H′[ϕ′(a¨)]a¨
∫ aˆ
af (a)da = ϕ′(a¨)ϕ(a¨)H′
= −a¨f (a¨)ϕ(a¨)H′ (10)
q. (10) expresses the usual external effect of changes in scien-
iﬁc effort. Reduced work by scientists of lesser ability results in a
maller stock ϕ′(ä) = −äf(ä) of scientiﬁc knowledge and this decre-
ent can no longer be used by the human capital remaining ϕ(ä).
he external consequence is less signiﬁcant if H′ is small and fur-
her scientiﬁc work is of low potential productivity even when
nterpreted and used by the most able people.
For H′ > 0, this externality produces the usual result that the
quilibrium size of the invisible college is suboptimal. At ä = å the
ent of each marginal scientists is zero (å = 0) and hence (from Eqs.
8) and (9))
∂W(a¨)/∂a¨ = −å f (å )ϕ(å )H′ ≤ 0
(a¨ = å )
Aggregate rents would increase by using additional less talented
cientists. Maximisation of W requires
∂W(a¨)
∂a¨
= −a¨f  (a¨)H[ϕ(a¨)] − a¨f (a¨)ϕ(a¨)H′ + cf (a¨) = 0.
f this equation is satisﬁed at ä = ã the losses, at maximum W
ssumed greater than zero, of scientists with ability such that
 ≤ a < å are more than offset by the positive rents of scientists for
hom å ≤ a ≤ â. In other words, the optimum requires a visible
ollege to redistribute rents from the more able towards the less
ble.
Eq. (8) also indicates that as c declines towards zero scientists
f lesser ability should join the college and that with c = 0 scientists
f all abilities should be used. With cf(ä) > 0 however, a sufﬁciently
ow level of ability ä will imply ∂W(ä)/∂ä > 0 and the college should
ptimally shrink its membership.
. An illustrative special case
Let the scientists be uniformly distributed between a = 0 and
 = â with f(a) = 1. Let there be no diminishing returns to additions
o the scientiﬁc pool so that H[ϕ(ä)] = ϕ(ä) and H′ = 1.∫ aˆ
1 2
a¨ =
a¨
af (a)da = ϕ(a¨) =
2
(aˆ − a¨2) and ϕ′(a¨) = −a¨. (1′)
a¨ = a¨H[ϕ(a¨)] − c =
(
1
2
)
a¨(aˆ2 − a¨2) − c (5′)olicy 43 (2014) 1014–1024
Thus
∂a¨
∂a¨
= a¨H′[ϕ′(a¨)] + H[ϕ(a¨)] = −a¨2 + 1
2
(aˆ2 − a¨2)
and ∂a¨/∂a¨ = 0 at a¨ = ±aˆ/
√
3.
The cubic Eq. (5′) must have two  positive roots if an invisible
college is to be sustainable. If there are no positive roots, the over-
head costs to each scientist of engaging in scientiﬁc activity are
at all points too great to permit positive rents to be made by the
marginal scientist. In such a case there might still be positive aggre-
gate rents to scientiﬁc effort but capturing them would require the
formation of a visible college. Without redistribution within the
college and a method of rewarding scientists for external beneﬁts
conferred on others, loss-making scientists would leave and the col-
lege would collapse. The situation would be close to the traditional
‘public good’ model of science.
Eq. (5′) is shown diagrammatically in Fig. 2. The ﬁgure includes
negative values of ä but these are clearly not relevant for our pur-
poses. Using the ﬁgure it is possible to see that the contribution
good model proposed here does not escape entirely from the tra-
ditional dilemmas. If the most able scientists cannot on their own
achieve positive rents of ability, gaining the social beneﬁts of scien-
tiﬁc enquiry must require the pooling of scientiﬁc knowledge. The
problem is to explain how this pooling comes into existence.
Some ‘visible’ hand is required to devise institutions that
encourage scientiﬁc endeavour. This could be envisaged as an unin-
tended outcome of some other activity or as a conscious decision
by a group of scientists to form a college or society. The problem,
it will be recalled, is not reluctance to contribute to the common
resource in order to ‘free ride’ on the work of others, but to estab-
lish conﬁdence that enough other scientists of sufﬁcient ability will
join the college to make the investment of c worthwhile. For val-
ues of ä (the least able college member) greater than åH it can
be seen that the college is too small for this least able scientist
to derive positive rents from use of the common pool. Aggregate
college rents, however, are positive at a value of ä greater than åH.
Clearly W(ä = åH) > 0 since ∂(a, ä)/∂a > 0 and all college members
apart from the marginal ones are therefore achieving strictly pos-
itive rents. Thus W(ä) = 0 at a value of ä greater than åH. For all
college members to beneﬁt from the pool at these smaller college
sizes however, there would have to be some sharing mechanism
until the critical size implied by ä = åH had been achieved.
Fig. 2 illustrates the point that a sufﬁciently high value of c can
result in the absence of any positive real roots to the equation of
ä and hence the impossibility of a self-sustaining invisible college.
Clearly there will be some value of c such that there is a repeated
root and (again given ∂(a, ä)/∂a > 0) this will imply that a visible
college could produce positive aggregate college rents. Indeed even
higher cost levels would have to be assumed before both visible and
invisible colleges became unsustainable at any college size.
The expression for aggregate rents in this special case is
W(a¨)  =
[
1
2
(aˆ2 − a¨2)
]2
− c(aˆ − a¨). (7′)
Similarly
W ′(a¨) = −a¨
[
1
2
(aˆ2 − a¨2)
]
− a¨
[
1
2
(aˆ2 − a¨2)
]
+ c (8′)
These expressions are written so as to permit easy comparison
with (7) and (8). Eq. (8′) draws attention to the fact that, in this
case, the loss of revenue to the marginally excluded scientist when
ability increases is precisely equal to the resulting aggregate loss in
revenue over all the other ability levels. This, of course, derives from
the fact that the revenue to each scientist is simply the product of
his or her ability and the aggregate stock. The loss to all the other
scientists combined when a person of ability ä leaves the college
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within the Society rather than outside it. A relatively small scientiﬁc
world would have permitted the most able scientists to use social
pressure to encourage membership and enforce conventions8
6 Merton described modern science as being characterised by the acronym CUDOS
which represented (i) communalism (by which scientists share knowledge volun-
tarily), (ii) universalism (by which claims to truth are judged by impersonal criteria,
(iii) disinterestedness (by which scientists appear to act selﬂessly), and (iv) orga-
nised scepticism (by which ideas are scrutinised collectively.)
7 The convention was also established that papers are accepted for publication
only  if they contain a methods section as well as a results section, to allow repro-
ducibility. These conventions were in stark contrast to the preceding era in which
scientists often expended considerable effort in attempts to maintain secrecy. Some
scientists, having dated the report of a discovery, would seal and deposit it with a
college or lawyer, only to open it to dispute priority when a later competitive publi-
cation appeared. Others would publish in code or in anagrams. Galileo, for example,
revealed his discovery of the rings of Saturn in 1610 as smaismrmilmepoetaleumi-
bunenugttauiras for Altissimum planetam tergeminum observavi (I have observed theFig. 2. Curve of ä = ½ä[â2 − ä2] − c. Special cas
s thus the same product – where ä is the decrement in the stock
vailable to all the remaining scientists.
The loss of rents to existing scientists as the college contracts is
¨
∫ aˆ(
∂a
∂a¨
)
da =
a¨
∫ aˆ
(−aa¨)da = −a¨
[
1
2
(aˆ2 − a¨2)
]
. (10′)
Conversely, as the marginal ability level declines with college
xpansion the external beneﬁt to other scientists of new members
ill decline towards zero. Optimally the college should expand to
he point at which these declining marginal external beneﬁts just
qual the losses incurred by the new members.
. Discussion
.1. Cultural norms in science and technology
Our proposed model of science as a contribution good relies
n the distinction between ‘open’ science and ‘privately appropri-
ble’ technology but does not see these two worlds as inhabited by
on-overlapping groups of people with entirely separate customs
nd norms. Dasgupta and David (1994) also recognise that indi-
idual scientists can span both worlds but argue that maintaining
 suitable dynamic balance between the two represents a major
hallenge for science policy. In particular science and technol-
gy are ‘two distinctively organised and functionally differentiated
pheres’ (p. 517) and open science ‘is constantly in need of shoring
p through public patronage’ (p. 514) without which ‘sooner or
ater, economic progress almost certainly would lose the sustained
haracter that has been taken by many scholars to distinguish ours
rom previous historical epochs’ (p. 515). Universities for example
onfer great external beneﬁts on technology by socialising students
n the norms of open science and enabling them to signal their tal-
nts to the technological sector which will ultimately employ many
f them.The ‘contribution’ good framework leads to much less empha-
is on the necessity of functional differentiation between the two
pheres and suggests a somewhat different standpoint from which
o view Robert Merton’s (1942) work on ‘The Normative Structureiform distribution of ability {f(a) = 1, 0 < a < â}.
of Science’.6 We  would argue that the communalism and disin-
terestedness apparently associated with science can be seen as
deriving from the assumed conditions of the contribution game
itself whereby spillovers accrue mainly to contributors. Ultimately
such communalism is buttressed by self-interest. The norms now
associated with science evolved over a long period and pre-date
large scale public patronage. Shapin and Schaffer (1985) show how
the Royal Society of London, the world’s oldest surviving research
society, was founded in 1660 for the purposes of promoting the
non-exclusion of science, and they describe how the Royal Soci-
ety developed the convention of ‘priority’ by which esteem goes to
the scientist who  actually publishes ﬁrst.7 The conventions devel-
oped by the Royal Society towards the end of the seventeenth
century might on occasion disadvantage an individual fellow by
requiring the sharing of scientiﬁc knowledge but each fellow would
be systematically advantaged by accessing the details of the work
of the others. Self-interest was  ultimately better served by beingmost distant planet to have a triple form) while Robert Hooke revealed his law of
elasticity in 1660 as ceiiinosssttuv for ut tensio sic vis (stress is proportional to strain).
8 Echoes of these conditions continue even today. Many learned societies are run
on  club lines, with potential members being nominated and seconded before their
memberships are voted upon.
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hile the social status associated with college membership would
lso have skewed communications away from those outside thus
urther handicapping any attempt to free ride.9 We  could regard
his as a period in which a visible college was required to assemble
 critical mass of scientiﬁc talent.
The modern republic of science is far removed, of course, from
he initial conditions found in 17th century London, and it is
easonable to ask whether its expanding population and sponta-
eously widening frontiers might undermine its founding values.
ltimately this would seem to depend on how far these values
re self-enforcing within an ‘invisible college’ because of the tacit
ature of much scientiﬁc knowledge. Some evidence is consis-
ent with the hypothesis that openness is self-enforcing. Within
ndustry some studies have found a correlation between the peer-
eviewed publication rates of scientists and company proﬁt, while
ansﬁeld (1980) and Griliches (1986) showed that there was  a
irect correlation between ﬁrms’ investment in basic research (a
roxy perhaps for the amount of scientiﬁc ability devoted to sci-
nce within the ﬁrm) and their proﬁtability. Freeman and Soete
1997) estimated that some 7 per cent of industrial R&D worldwide
s spent on basic science. As Hicks and Katz (1997) showed, this
ndustrial investment in basic science translates into substantial
ates of publication in the academic peer-reviewed literature, with
ajor companies equalling the publication rates of medium-sized
niversities. Stephan (1996) discusses how companies balance the
eeds of publication against the need for proprietary information
hile business case studies reveal how older companies such as
upont learned from their own experience that a policy of secrecy
s not necessarily the most proﬁtable – a lesson that newer compa-
ies such as Genentech internalised when they were founded with
 very free publication policy. The idea that spillovers asymmet-
ically favour contributors over free riders is however, central to
he entire contribution good model and further empirical work is
ecessary to ascertain how robust and widespread such conditions
re.
.2. Science and the ﬁrm
The contribution good model requires that scientists are able
o gain ﬁnancial rewards from the common pool of science. The
nstitutional mechanisms that enable these rewards to be claimed
re not modelled explicitly but are simply assumed to exist. The
ontribution good model of science has direct relevance, therefore,
or research programmes in business structure and organisation. In
odern Institutional Economics the ﬁrm is seen (i) as a substituteor relatively high costs of transacting in the market, after Coase
1937); (ii) as a means of coping with uninsurable uncertainty and
ontinual change, after Knight (1921); and (iii) as a vehicle for insti-
ating technological innovation, after Schumpeter (1934, 1943).10
9 Insiders could however use their reputational advantage to free ride on the work
f  outsiders. William Smith’s geological map  of England (1815) was published with-
ut proper acknowledgement by the Geological Society of London (1819). ‘British
cientists of an era long past behaved quite unforgivably towards one who was so
elf-evidently not one of their own’ (Winchester, 2001, p. 223).
10 Some of this literature has developed a highly critical view of standard ‘opti-
ising’ models in economics and instead emphasises evolutionary methods with
boundedly rational’ decision makers adjusting to emerging information generated
ithin the ﬁrm and outside. Major examples include Nelson and Winter (1982),
asson (2001), Kay (1979), Teece (1992) and Foss (1993). Recent contributions,
or  example, Teece (2007) have emphasised the development within the ﬁrm of
dynamic capabilities’ linked to human capital, internal and external information
etworks and entrepreneurial skills. The inﬂuence of Schumpeter’s work is pivotal
nd has led to a literature on ‘neo-Schumpeterian Economics’. Hanusch and Pyka
2007, p. 2) outline the main tenets of this paradigm as a concern with competi-
ion  in innovation rather than in price, and recognition that this competition ‘often
ccurs between networks of actors, where new knowledge is created and diffusedolicy 43 (2014) 1014–1024
The conversion of scientiﬁc knowledge into new tradable goods
and services confronts obvious transactional difﬁculties between
scientists and technologists, technologists and entrepreneurs, and
entrepreneurs and ﬁnanciers. Cooperation between these ele-
ments entails high costs of transacting and is likely to involve
the formation of ﬁrms with internal labour markets and specially
designed incentive arrangements to mitigate them. Hansmann’s
(1996) proposition that ownership rights tend to be assigned to the
group that faces the highest transactions costs might suggest, for
example, the development of scientist-owned ﬁrms or ﬁrms with
signiﬁcant control rights in the hands of the knowledge creators
and users.
The science-technology link is particularly pertinent to the
functional separation that Dasgupta and David see as necessary
to the maintenance of a suitable ‘synergistic equilibrium’. The
complementarities between science and its applications and the
transactional difﬁculties of linking them across markets, would
imply some advantages to integration.11 Firms could not, in our
pure contribution good world, specialise in pure research because
their results would not be tradable and revenues are ultimately
derived from the products of technology. Thus integration is, so
to speak, inherent in our approach. Within the ﬁrm, however,
there would still be problems of managing the science-technology
interface if the people involved were speciﬁc and still ‘function-
ally separated’. The model we  have presented assigns a particular
level of ability to each scientist and this ability represents both the
additional ‘contribution’ to the pool of scientiﬁc knowledge and
the scientist’s skill at turning the pool to commercial advantage.
Clearly, the relation in a scientist’s work between his or her ‘contri-
bution’ to the common pool of science and the ability of the scientist
to use the whole pool to generate commercially valuable technol-
ogy might vary. ‘Contribution’ would always be implied – but it
might not be related to the ability to apply science to proﬁtable
technology.
Science is a common resource in our model, and ﬁrms will be
interested in gaining access to the combined contributions of all
scientists. It is, however, the ability of scientists in the area of
technology that will determine whether or not they can operate
proﬁtably. Thus, in our ‘contribution good model’, the pool of sci-
ence will be made up from the contributions of the best and most
entrepreneurial in the realm of technology rather than simply the
best ‘scientists’ (deﬁned as those conferring the greatest external
beneﬁts on other college members). If these rather different abili-
ties (contributing to the republic of science and using it for private
gain) were independently and randomly distributed between sci-
entists, there would be no expected loss to the pool of ‘science’
from selecting the best ‘technologists’ to comprise the college. On
the other hand if it could be shown that (for example) the scientiﬁc
contributions with the greatest potential tended to be made by peo-
ple with relatively limited abilities in technology there would be a
tendency to use ‘too few’ of these people (even in the unlikely event
that they could provide an ex ante signal of their ability). Again,
within the ﬁrm, teams of scientists with varying strengths could
cooperate, and internalise some of the externalities (a possible
advantage for large and diversiﬁed ﬁrms)12 and across ﬁrms coop-
erative ‘industry’ or ‘sector’ research establishments might evolve
as a result of mutual agreement. These comments are offered,
collectively’. Instead of the public good conception of knowledge ‘the tacit, local,
and complex character of knowledge are emphasized’ (p. 3).
11 Teece (1988, p. 277), for example, writes that ‘The natural organisational home
for  research appears to be inside the corporation, alongside production/operations’.
The reasons are the richness of information ﬂows within the corporation and the
problem of writing R and D contracts.
12 For example Kay (1988, p. 285) and Nelson (1959).
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interpreting the evolution of scientiﬁc institutions and commercial
organisations as well as the development of public policy.
13 These concerns were expressed by Hall and Reenen (2000) who  showed thatT. Kealey, M. Ricketts / Rese
owever, to show that our proposed model of science requires
uitable institutional mechanisms to exist for the spontaneous
evelopment of the ‘invisible college’ to take place and that these
echanisms relate closely to much recent work on the way that
rganisations are structured to encourage and manage scientiﬁc
nd technological change.
.3. College formation, subsidies and growth
Although our model is not speciﬁcally designed to investigate
ublic policy, it does allow us to analyse the effects of subsidies on
cience, assuming that subsidies reduce the cost to each scientist of
ngaging in scientiﬁc work and assuming that subsidies effectively
ay the implicit entry fee to the college.
If no college exists, whether visible or invisible, action from
hatever source that reduces C will lower the size of college at
hich aggregate rents to the members become positive. In the ini-
ial stages we might surmise that the transactions costs associated
ith college formation are substantial and that subsidies could be
een as a means of overcoming them. An analysis in the spirit of
oase (1937) would therefore look at the factors that might reduce
ransactional impediments to college formation over time.
The simple model proposed here does not lead to the conclu-
ion that state subsidy is a necessary condition either for college
ormation or for its subsequent growth. It merely draws attention
o the well-understood proposition that, in the presence of external
ffects, social beneﬁts will accrue from the evolution of institutions
apable of internalising them. The state subsidy of science could in
ure logic (and ignoring all public choice considerations) represent
ne way of creating initial conditions suitable for the incubation
f scientiﬁc advance. Aristocratic or philanthropic subsidy might
chieve the same, whereas private governance might similarly be
apable of producing a scientiﬁc college for sufﬁciently low values
f c – rather as Ostrom (1990) shows that local institutions have
volved to handle environmental externalities.
The history of scientiﬁc colleges in the west conﬁrms that
heir founding often did require subsidies, either from the state or
rom aristocrats. One of the world’s ﬁrst scientiﬁc academies, the
ccademia dei Lincei (literally the “Academy of the Lynx-Eyed”,
he lynx having famously acute vision) was created in Rome by a
mall group of aristocrats in 1603. Social connections and wealth
layed an important role in establishing the Academia although it
ailed to achieve a self-sustaining character and did not move into
ur phase of spontaneous growth to a stable size. Indeed, after the
ccademia’s leader, Frederico Cesi, died in 1630, the Accademia
tself died soon afterwards.
The Royal Society in London was created by a similar group of
ristocrats, amongst whom Robert Boyle was prominent for his
ealth and leadership. But other countries have seen their gov-
rnments create their ﬁrst academies. Thus the French Academy
f Sciences was created in 1666 by Louis XIV on the suggestion
f Colbert, while the National Academy of Sciences in the USA was
reated by Congress in 1863. It was foreshadowed, though, by a less
isible, more Ostromian, college, the Lazzaroni, which was a club
reated in 1851 by Alexander Bache, who was the superintendent
f the Coast Survey and the great-grandson of Benjamin Franklin,
nd who was to be the National Academy’s ﬁrst president. Over the
ast 300 years in the west, therefore, it appears that either wealthy
ristocrats or governments have contributed to scientiﬁc advance
y implicitly or explicitly reducing the costs of college formation.
Once a scientiﬁc community or ‘college’ reaches a particular
inimum size, our model suggests that a ‘take-off’ occurs andhe invisible college grows spontaneously. Lowering the costs of
cience to the participants will extend the college further and tra-
itional theory would recommend a subsidy equal to the external
eneﬁts conferred by additional members on the incumbents.olicy 43 (2014) 1014–1024 1023
If each scientist receives a subsidy
 = å ϕ(å )H′ where å H[ϕ(å )] − c +  = 0
the college will expand to an optimal size. The subsidy here is in the
tradition of Pigou (1938, p. 224) and analogous to his recommenda-
tion of a ‘bounty’ to industries characterised by ‘decreasing supply
price’. This would be a difﬁcult and contentious ﬁgure to estimate
empirically. In principle it could be ﬁnanced by a tax on the rents of
the membership of the invisible college – although this raises the
question of how far an ‘invisible’ institution with no formal gover-
nance structure could give rise to a membership capable of yielding
tax revenue to the state or of administering internal redistribution
of rent.
Assuming that subsidies to science are ﬁnanced not from the
internal rents of the college members but from general tax revenue,
public choice questions concerning the interests of the scientiﬁc
community become relevant. In particular it is evident that, in our
model of the invisible college, every scientist has a private inter-
est in college expansion because ∂(a, ä)/∂ä ≤ 0 (Eq. (4)) and the
most able scientists are those who stand to gain the most. Shrink-
ing the college lowers the rents achieved at all ability levels and
vice versa. There is clearly therefore a danger that access to public
subsidies will result in expansion of the college beyond the theo-
retical optimum and that the ﬁnal position will be no more efﬁcient
(or even less so) than the original invisible college equilibrium. The
efﬁciency costs of the taxes levied to fund the subsidy will also
reduce the optimal (second best) size of the college.13
The ‘contribution good’ model can therefore be seen to ﬁt into
a long-established tradition in economics – a tradition that even
its founders recognised used ‘static’ tools of analysis that were
imperfectly suited to the dynamic nature of its subject matter.
Nevertheless we  argue that treating science as a contribution good
casts a useful light on the nature of spillover beneﬁts and their
consequences. It directs attention to the conditions necessary for
the invisible college to form and to expand in the ﬁrst place (the
critical mass problem) as well as the institutional mechanisms
that address this problem and that enable rents to be earned from
the process of innovation. The marginal inefﬁciencies that might
theoretically remain after the college has ceased to grow are those
that have traditionally concerned public policy. As Metcalf (2007,
p. 962) argues, however, this focus of policy has been misplaced
and over several decades has already been subject to change.
Instead of attempting to correct for market failures, the state
should aim to set the conditions ‘in which innovation systems can
better self-organise’. This agenda would include ‘effective bridging
arrangements’ between individuals in Universities and other insti-
tutions, encouraging collaborative research programmes, science
parks, cluster developments, arrangements for technology transfer
and so forth. By reducing the costs of access and by creating
conditions conducive to scientists gaining increasing external
beneﬁts from the common pool of knowledge created by their
various activities and associated contributions, this policy agenda
has close afﬁnities with the model proposed in this paper. The
contribution good model of science provides a new framework fortax  credits induce ﬁrms to increase their expenditure on R&D, but who worried that
“Lowering the cost of research might cause the ﬁrm to do too much. Even though
the  tax credit induces more industrial R&D than the lost tax revenue, it would not be
a  good idea, because one could have spent that tax revenue on some other activity,
which had higher social return.”
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